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Protecting the Party Girl: A New Approach for 
Evaluating Intoxicated Consent 
Christine Chambers Goodman 
I. INTRODUCTION 
She sees him across the room, and he catches her eye, returning her 
smile. She raises her glass, as does he, and they toast one another 
silently. Soon, he joins her in the line at the bar and buys her 
another drink. They talk and dance and drink and flirt. Hours later, 
he walks her home, and he reaches for her at the door. Enjoying 
the kissing and caresses, she lets him slide her keys out of her hand. 
He opens her apartment door, lifts her up, and gallantly carries her 
over the threshold, setting her on the couch. She thinks about how 
lucky she is to have caught his eye tonight. The kisses and caresses 
resume as she murmurs, “It’s getting late.” Suddenly, she feels 
something cold and realizes that he is reaching into her pants, 
tugging them down, as he slides his hand inside. She says, “Wait. I 
need to sleep.” He says, “I’ve been waiting to do this all night.” 
She closes her eyes. Moments later, she feels a sharp pain piercing 
her body. Stunned, she cannot speak or move. It is too late. 
In allegations of rape and sexual assault the issues of consent and 
resistance are slippery ones, which become even more so when 
alcohol is added to the scenario. Drinking is a social activity for 
many, and “so it is not surprising that when one party is consuming 
alcohol, the other party is consuming it as well.”1 The tendency for 
mutual intoxication, combined with the fact that alcohol is present in 
approximately fifty percent of situations involving allegations of 
sexual assault and rape, make it even more important that society 
 
  Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; A.B. Harvard College, cum 
laude, 1987; J.D. Stanford Law School, 1991. I wish to thank the Dean’s Summer Research 
Fund, Denise Sanders for outstanding research at the genesis of this project, Candace Warren, 
Sophia Sipsas, and Gail Chester for their dedicated work on numerous drafts, and the excellent 
editorial work by the BYU Law Review. This Article is dedicated to each of my criminal law 
students who endured the Berkowitz case. 
 1. Valerie M. Ryan, Comment, Intoxicating Encounters: Allocating Responsibility in the 
Law of Rape, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 407, 411–12 (2004) (citations omitted). 
GOODMAN.PP3 2/13/2009 5:56 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2009 
58 
address the ongoing problems that intoxication has on a woman’s 
ability to resist or consent to sexual activities.2 
This Article endeavors to provide some guidance to courts and 
juries in evaluating whether there was valid consent to intercourse 
when alcohol has been consumed by one or both parties. In doing 
so, this Article will attempt to address the more difficult cases 
involving scenarios that are closer to the line dividing consent from 
non-consent. Consequently, this Article will not address the so-called 
“easier” cases involving substantial force, coercion, threats, weapons, 
or situations where one party administers intoxicants in an effort to 
incapacitate a victim to the point where consent cannot be obtained.3 
Because of the varied effects alcohol has on perceptions, this 
Article proposes a sliding-scale approach toward evaluating consent 
that would establish an appropriate level of explicit consent that 
varies with the number of drinks or level of intoxication of the 
parties. It may be appropriate to raise the level of explicitness 
required to constitute effective consent with the number of drinks or 
level of intoxication of the parties. 
To help establish the applicability of a sliding-scale approach, this 
Article will address the issues of when explicit consent is sufficient as 
well as how to deal with problems surrounding a woman’s use of 
equivocal language when providing consent. When an affirmative 
“Yes, I am sure,” will be the only sufficient indication of consent will 
depend on the circumstances, because levels of intoxication will vary 
based upon the size and weight of the individuals, their alcohol 
tolerance, and other factors. Therefore, any standard must be a 
flexible one. A sliding scale provides an opportunity for the jury to 
consider the level of intoxication and its relation to the appropriate 
or reasonable level of explicitness required for adequate consent by 
mandating a more unequivocal, more affirmative yes the more the 
female has had to drink. In other words, more explicit consent will 
be required the greater the amount of alcohol consumed. This 
 
 2. Ryan explains that “researchers have determined that approximately half of all 
sexual-assault victims, and half of all sexual-assault perpetrators drink alcohol before an offense 
occurs. Specifically in the context of acquaintance rape, alcohol is usually involved.” Id. at 411; 
see also Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44 
ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 142–46 (2002) (explaining that there are a large number of cases involving 
men sexually assaulting women who were intoxicated). 
 3. For an overview of statutes regarding offender induced incapacitation, see Falk, 
supra note 2, at 156–87, which discusses these laws by categories.  
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sliding scale also may be applied to men, recognizing that the male is 
more responsible for obtaining the requisite level of explicitness for 
effectively legal consent, the fewer number of drinks he has 
consumed in the relevant time period. 
The verbal resistance issue also demonstrates the usefulness of a 
sliding scale when evaluating non-consent. When a woman says no, 
that should mean no, which is increasingly, though not universally, 
understood. However, should “I don’t think we should” when she 
has had a few drinks be the equivalent of no? Should falling onto the 
bed without saying yes be the equivalent of no when she has had a 
lot to drink? Should we consider a softer no, or a less explicit no as 
sufficient evidence of non-consent, the more alcohol the woman has 
consumed? This formulation would parallel the suggestion above in 
that it would be better to require a more explicit yes when more 
alcohol has been consumed. While we cannot develop a formula for 
the exact number of drinks consumed in a particular time period, this 
Article seeks to develop some guiding standards and suggests that 
ambiguous consent becomes more ambiguous, and less able to 
constitute adequate consent to negate a charge of rape, the more 
alcohol that a female has consumed. 
Another option that bears consideration in dealing with the close 
cases that result from voluntary intoxication is to focus on the force, 
“forcible compulsion,” or threat of force element that is a part of 
many rape and sexual assault statutes. The sliding scale could be 
employed here as well by requiring a lesser showing of force to satisfy 
the force element when either of the parties has consumed alcohol. 
Indeed, in some jurisdictions no force need be shown when the 
woman is too intoxicated to consent effectively. However, the level 
of alcohol consumption necessary to trigger the rape by intoxication 
claim is very high and also must be such that her intoxication was 
known or should have been known to the male.4 Unfortunately, that 
cut-off does not protect a significant number of women who are not 
severely intoxicated and who could, and perhaps should, be 
protected by a sliding-scale approach. 
 
 4. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3) (providing a definition of rape which does 
not contain any force or resistance requirement when the victim is prevented from resisting by 
an intoxicating substance and the perpetrator knows or should reasonably know of the victim’s 
condition); see also discussion infra Part II.C.  
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Even in states where statutes omit any explicit reference to 
resistance, courts still implicitly consider resistance as evidence of 
force or of non-consent and a lack of resistance as evidence of 
consent. Interestingly, some courts apply a sliding scale, expecting 
(or implicitly requiring) less resistance the greater the implicit or 
explicit force used.5 This Article suggests that alcohol consumption 
should trigger a sliding scale on the issue of resistance also. Alcohol, 
like fear, can have an impact on a woman’s ability to resist. Some 
women are unable to move and almost temporarily paralyzed when 
confronted with a physical attack, and thus it is reasonable to 
consider that some women similarly may be less able to resist when 
under the effects of alcohol. The reasons for this diminished ability 
to resist will be addressed in Part III below. 
A sliding-scale approach also serves to protect the male interests 
as well by requiring more evidence of force when only a minimum 
amount of alcohol has been consumed. A woman who drinks 
regularly and has one glass of wine on a particular evening should 
not be able to claim that she was paralyzed, or in an alcohol-induced 
depressive state that prevented her from saying no, without some 
other evidence of coercion or force leading to the sexual encounter. 
This issue will be explored in Part IV below. 
Perhaps the most radical proposition in this Article is the 
following: silence never should be adequate to constitute consent 
when either of the parties has consumed alcohol. As many authors 
and researchers have noted, alcohol is often involved in sexual 
activities, both consensual and non-consensual. Why not curtail the 
ambiguity to which silence is so susceptible and require affirmative 
consent of some type to counteract the effects of alcohol, including 
the distortion of perception and increase in risk-taking? 
Part II of this Article provides background on the various 
conceptions and definitions of consent generally, in the rape context 
specifically, and then in the context of intoxication. Part III analyzes 
 
 5. See State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 728 (Md. 1981) (“That a victim did not scream 
out for help or attempt to escape, while bearing on the question of consent, is unnecessary 
where she is restrained by fear of violence.”); McQueen v. State, 423 So. 2d 800, 802–03 
(Miss. 1982) (“Appellant did not threaten to injure prosecutrix . . . . The evidence  
presented . . . is legally insufficient to support a conviction for the crime of forcible rape.”); 
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1346–48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), aff’d in part 
and vacated in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994) (finding evidence insufficient to convict 
defendant of rape when victim did not resist and did not allege “threats or mental coercion”). 
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studies about the effects of alcohol consumption on the behaviors of 
men and women and the double standard as to responsibility that 
exists between the genders. Part IV then describes the sliding-scale 
proposal and analyzes how this proposed reallocation of risks results 
in a more just administration of rape law. Part V concludes the 
Article. 
II. BACKGROUND  
This section provides a brief description of the different 
conceptions of consent generally and some background on consent 
in the context of rape law specifically. It then describes the specifics 
of intoxicated consent. 
A. A Brief Introduction to Consent Generally  
There are many ways of conceptualizing the general idea of 
consent.  
One common understanding of consent is that one “authorizes” 
another to act in an area that is part of one’s domain, e.g., giving 
power-of-attorney to another [or] . . . giving permission to another 
to cross over a boundary of one’s own. . . . In the case of rape, as in 
other areas, consent turns a criminal act into a noncriminal one.6  
This “boundary crossing” aspect of consent has duration and scope 
limitations.7 For instance, one who consents to the loan of personal 
property on one occasion and provides permission for another to 
cross that personal boundary is not deemed thereby to have 
consented to any subsequent loans or gifts.8  
H. M. Malm also provides a useful summary of the different 
conceptualizations of consent. One such understanding is consent as 
willingness, which is described as “more along the lines of ‘willing to 
 
 6.  Joan McGregor, Why When She Says No She Doesn't Mean Maybe and Doesn’t Mean 
Yes: A Critical Reconstruction of Consent, Sex, and the Law, 2 LEGAL THEORY 175, 192 
(1996) (“Consent must, then, be deliberate and voluntarily, since its explicit purpose is to 
change the world by changing the structure of rights and obligations of the parties  
involved. . . . Within the sovereign zone of our domain, all others have a duty to refrain from 
crossing over without our permission. Consent cancels that duty, at least in regard to the 
specific acts consented to, and for specified time.”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. (“Giving consent to someone does not mean that, forever after, that person 
rightfully has access to that part of the person’s domain. If I let you use my car today, you are 
not violating my right by using it today. However you have no claim over it tomorrow.”). 
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go along with’ or ‘accepting’ than either ‘wanting’ or ‘desiring.’”9 
Malm describes this notion of consent as important to understanding 
“implied” or “tacit” consent, which he defines as “consent given by 
refraining from an act rather than performing an act.”10 The idea 
here is that willingness to go along is sufficient for consent in some 
circumstances. According to Malm, “[C]onsent is best defined as the 
signification of a mental state, rather than as the mental state  
itself . . . [because] the mental state associated with consent comes in 
degrees, whereas consent does not.”11 As Malm explains, consent 
does not get stronger simply because there are more reasons 
supporting it, or less strong because there are fewer reasons to 
support it.12 One’s feelings leading to consent may be very strong or 
not very strong but still produce the same result once the threshold 
between non-consent and consent has been crossed.13  
That threshold to consent can be crossed based on morally 
appropriate, or morally inappropriate stimuli, and, as differentiated 
by Malm, between immoral means of obtaining consent that would 
invalidate consent and those that would not.14 For example, a benefit 
such as admission to graduate school in exchange for sex would not 
invalidate consent.15 Although such an exchange may be immoral in 
other ways, consent can be manifested by the willingness to submit 
in exchange for a greater benefit than the detriment suffered.16 
Willingness to submit based on a cost-benefit calculation, however, 
can invalidate consent when those “costs” are disproportionate, or 
“sufficiently immoral,” such as consenting due to a threat to kill a 
third person.17  
 
 9. H.M. Malm, The Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law on 
Rape, 2 LEGAL THEORY 147, 148 (1996). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 149. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 150–55. 
 15. Id. at 151. 
 16. Id. Alan Wertheimer also recognizes that “[i]t is a mistake to think that consent 
always works ‘to make an action right when it would otherwise be wrong,’ if ‘right’ is 
equivalent to ‘morally worthy’ or ‘justified.’” Alan Wertheimer, What Is Consent? And Is It 
Important?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 560 (2000) (citation omitted). He uses the example 
of exchanging money for sex, which may be morally wrong but does not constitute the crime 
of rape—even though the exchange of money as a basis for consent is morally wrong. Id. 
 17. Malm explains: 
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It appears as though society is left with two choices: “we must 
either stipulate an artificially limited range of acts as acts that will 
count as consent, or be willing to live with a broader, fuzzy-
bordered range and run the risk of ambiguity and mistake, in 
particular cases, as to whether the person consented.”18 Malm 
suggests that the more appropriate choice would be placing 
limitations on manifestations of consent, particularly in 
circumstances where the presence or absence of consent has serious 
ramifications.19 The artificially limited range would be reserved “for 
activities that have significant consequences and are such that a 
mistake about consent cannot be corrected prior to the realization of 
those consequences.”20  
Malm then provides a standard for evaluating whether consent 
has been obtained in the more high-stakes situations with this 
“general rule”: “the more the nonparadigmatic act is open to other 
interpretations ([that is], as done for reasons other than to signifying 
[sic] willingness to [consent to] a particular activity), the less justified 
we are interpreting it as an act of consent.”21 For instance, test 
driving a car is not consent to consummate a purchase contract for 
the car, and attending an open house is not consent to enter into 
escrow on the home.22 Test driving and house hunting can be 
precursors to the eventual consummation of the “contract” (for those 
who have decided which to purchase and simply want to take one 
last look before “signing on the dotted line”), or they can be 
 
Either the offer was sufficiently immoral to preclude consent, in which case the 
woman was raped or assaulted, or it was not sufficiently immoral, in which case the 
woman consented and no wrong was done. In contrast, a non-normative account of 
consent allows us to explain such judgments in terms of the choices one makes 
relative to one’s options. The woman was wronged both by having an option-
closing offer imposed on her without her consent (with the forced choice creating a 
psychological harm that is independent of the offerer’s ultimate action) and by the 
action imposed on her after her choice was made. But the degree of the latter harm 
is limited to the degree of the lesser of the evils that were open to her, because only 
the lesser was unavoidable.  
Malm, supra note 9, at 153–54. The issue of coercion arises here as well but is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  
 18. Id. at 154. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. The author gives examples of surgery or selling a house at a specific price as 
“activities with significant consequences.” Id. at 155. 
 21. Id. at 155. 
 22. See id. at 154–55. 
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substitutes (for those who just want to drive a sports car past a former 
lover or want to dream about a mansion that is not within one’s 
budget). Malm’s suggested standard supports the sliding scale that 
this Article recommends by addressing the impact of potential 
ambiguity in interpretations about the presence or absence of 
consent generally. The next step is to apply this consent scale to the 
crime of rape.  
B. Consent in the Context of Rape 
If, as Malm suggests, consent is “a signification of a mental 
state”23 and that mental state can have various levels, the problem 
becomes ascertaining at what point the line from nonconsent to 
consent has been crossed when evaluating the criminality of sexual 
relations. In an effort to address this problem, many traditional rape 
statutes and common law standards require that the sexual act occur 
“without her consent,” which thereby requires the prosecution to 
affirmatively prove the lack of consent.24 In other jurisdictions, the 
lack of consent is not an explicit statutory requirement; rather, the 
presence of consent operates as an affirmative defense.25 In either 
case, it is important to have a legal definition of consent.  
Some states have attempted to address this problem by providing 
a definition of what constitutes valid consent. For example, 
California’s rape statute defines consent for cases in which consent is 
used as an affirmative defense, as “positive cooperation in act or 
attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will.” The statute further 
adds, “[t]he person must act freely and voluntarily and have 
knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved.”26 Falk 
praises California’s statute and recommends that other states use 
similar language that incorporates “the use of descriptive words such 
 
 23. Id. at 149. 
 24. See, e.g., State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981); and State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 
470 (N.C. 1984). 
 25. See, e.g., Cal. Jury Instructions Criminal 10.35 (West 2008). 
 26. Id. The statute further provides that “[a] current or previous dating or marital 
relationship shall not be sufficient to constitute consent where consent is at issue in a 
prosecution under [sections for rape, spousal rape, sodomy, or unlawful sexual penetration].” 
Id. 
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as informed, knowing, or reasoned, in characterizing the nature of 
the consent required in sexual assault cases.”27 
In addition to our need for consent definitions, consistent 
standards are also needed with regard to who bears the responsibility 
of communicating consent. Current interpretations require the male 
to have some level of awareness of the lack of consent. Because, 
however, our culture views women as more responsible than men 
when it comes to inciting sexual desire, the vital assumption seems to 
be “that the man merely misread the woman’s signals.”28 
Consequently, the view persists that “[t]he woman, not the man, has 
the responsibility for clear communication.”29 Because our society 
allows this seemingly double standard to exist, rape is one of the few 
crimes where jurors often blame the victim.30  
In response to the double-standard problem, Professor Ross 
proposes that rape statutes articulate a legal standard of conduct that 
would govern how a person is to act when confronted with 
“manifestations of possible non-consent to sexual conduct.”31 The 
 
 27. Falk, supra note 2, at 199–202. For example, the Sex Offenses Statute in Kansas sets 
out definitions for several terms but fails to include any definition of consent, KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-3501 (West 2008), even though rape is defined as “intercourse with a person who 
does not consent.” KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3501-02 (2007). 
 28. Andrew Taslitz, Race and Two Concepts of the Emotions in Date Rape, 15 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 30 (2000). 
 29. Id. Taslitz explains why the mechanistic view of sexual emotions is wrong. Id. at 31–
34. The next portion of the article then goes on to discuss the race issues involved, particularly 
of the alleged rape by a black man of a white woman. Id. at 35–43. 
 30. See, e.g., LINDA FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE WAR AGAINST RAPE, 133–
34 (1993). 
A major obstacle in the path of both the complaining witness and the prosecutor, 
then, is the archaic societal attitude, which remains so disturbingly pervasive, that 
sexual assaults are victim-precipitated crimes. This is the only category of criminal 
conduct that is perceived to have happened because of the victim’s actions, not the 
assailant’s. ‘What was she wearing?’ ‘How much did she have to drink?’ ‘What was 
she doing there at that hour of the night?’ Any one of those factors may have 
facilitated the rapist’s goal, but it was his criminal conduct that was solely responsible 
for the assault. 
Id.  
 31. Beverly J. Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make a Difference?: A Look at the 
Law of Rape, 100 DICK. L. REV. 795, 825 (1996). Ross cites Vandervort, who suggests that 
“judges and prosecutors reinterpret the meaning of nonconsent and incorporate into its 
definition, as an element of the crime, the standard of conduct required by the law when a 
person confronts manifestations of possible nonconsent to sexual contact.” Id. (citing Lucinda 
Vandervort, Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea, 2 CANADIAN J. 
WOMEN & L. 233, passim (1987–1988)). Ross continues, “Thus, an element of sexual assault 
would be any action taken to coerce sexual contact when a person does not explicitly affirm her 
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question then becomes what actions or words should trigger the 
“possibility of non-consent” and put the potential defendant on 
notice to inquire further or risk committing the crime of rape. For 
some, only express dissent operates as a trigger indicating non-
consent. Malm notes that often times “a woman is presumed to have 
consented unless she has provided a clear expression of dissent. Thus, 
the utter absence of any positive sign of consent would not be 
enough to establish nonconsent, nor would it be enough if some 
mild signs of dissent were added to it.”32 This Article, however, 
adopts the view that some evidence of dissent, even mild evidence of 
dissent, should be adequate to put the defendant on notice that any 
continued action towards sexual intercourse may be non-consensual 
or forced.33 
Consistent with Malm’s observations, many judges and juries 
view the fact of submission without struggle, resistance, or the lack 
of additional physical force as evidence of affirmative consent rather 
than the simple absence of evidence of non-consent. In part this view 
is prevalent because many people believe that sexual intercourse is 
generally a good thing,34 and because consensual sex is a rather 
 
consent. Lack of such an explicit affirmance of consent would be, as a matter of law, 
nonconsent.” Id. She explains that this re-characterization would not require additional 
legislation but rather would fall under the mistake of law doctrine, which generally does not 
operate as an effective defense. Id. at 825–26. 
 32. Malm, supra note 9, at 155 (emphasis in original). 
 33. See, e.g., Daphne Edwards, Comment, Acquaintance Rape and the “Force” Element: 
When “No” Is Not Enough, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 241, 279 (1996). As Edwards 
explains, the courts  
display an inability to recognize that if the victim has said “no,” and the perpetrator 
continues, the next physical action is in itself coercive. The assailant knows the victim 
has refused, and thus his action can only be characterized as intentionally coercive 
and threatening. His actions, at this point, speak louder than words: by ignoring her 
“no,” he is telling her she will participate. 
Id.  
 34. While the focus of this research has been on female’s consent to intercourse, we 
must not overlook that males sometimes succumb to intercourse against their will as well. One 
scholar describes a University of Washington study that found that:  
undergraduate males report having unwanted and coerced sexual activity in levels 
comparable to their female counterparts. Though the men do not report being 
physically forced to have sex, they report feeling powerless to stop their partners, 
being worn down by a partner’s arguments, as well as being plied with drugs or 
alcohol.  
Patricia Novotny, Rape Victims in the (Gender) Neutral Zone: The Assimilation of Resistance? 1 
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 743, 746 (2003) (citations omitted). Thus, Novotny reminds us that 
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common occurrence, it is more appropriate to have to prove the less-
common occurrence of non-consensual sex.35 Malm cautions that 
this assumption of consensual sex as an everyday common activity 
“would have a chance of succeeding only if indiscriminate sex were 
part of everyday life. For, after all, the negative definition of consent 
presumes that a woman has consented to have sex with any and every 
man.”36  
Rather, more commonly, parties who are attracted to one 
another are the ones who have sexual intercourse. As such, a default 
presumption of consent would make more sense if it was triggered 
by attraction rather than acquiescence. If there is no evidence of 
attraction, the default presumption should be non-consent, unless or 
until there is affirmative evidence to the contrary. For instance, Lois 
Pineau provides a hypothetical of a woman out on a date having an 
okay time, who wants to cuddle or snuggle, while the man expresses 
his frustration about how she is leading him on, as he whines for 
sex.37 Fighting her paradoxical feelings, the woman eventually 
succumbs, but does not consent, leaving us “unsure whether her 
mere reluctance, in the presence of high-pressure tactics, constitutes 
non-consent.”38 Pineau analyzes the reasoning behind this woman’s 
actions, relying upon the notion that attraction is an implicit 
requisite of agreement in sexual relations. The author opines that if 
“she was not attracted to the kind of sex offered by the sort of 
 
“the view that sex is always a win-win proposition for men may no longer make common 
sense.” Id. at 747. The author concludes: 
[O]ne aspect to solving the rape problem is to increase women’s agency in sex, 
generally enabling women to embrace and act on their own desires, or not. This 
increased agency may itself be viewed as a form of resistance. So women can make 
the phone call, can make the first move, can even, perhaps, push a reluctant male 
partner to go further than he wants. The corollary may be a reduction in male 
agency, or at least more fluidity, in the power relationships as they play out between 
individuals. In particular, men may not always want to have sex, and when they do 
against their wishes, it injures them.  
Id. at 749. 
 35. Malm, supra note 9, at 157–58 (citing Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L. J. 1087, 
1087–184). 
 36. Id. at 156. Malm continues, “Moreover, the above claim cannot explain why the 
crime of rape is treated differently from other crimes in which nonconsent is an element or 
consent a defense. As Susan Estrich points out, ‘Visiting (trespass with consent) is equally 
everyday, as is philanthropy (robbery with consent) and surgery (battery with consent).’” Id. 
(citing Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L. J. 1087, 1126 (1986)). 
 37. Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 L. & PHIL. 217, 222–23 (1989). 
 38. Id. at 223. 
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person offering it[,] [t]hen it would be prima facie unreasonable for 
her to agree to have sex” without some other sort of positive benefit 
in exchange.39 Pineau concludes, “Thus, where the presumption is 
that she was not attracted, we should at the same time presume that 
she did not consent. Hence, the burden of proof should be on her 
alleged assailant to show that she had good reasons for consenting to 
an unattractive proposition.”40 
Courts already consider the issue of attraction when evaluating 
the defendant’s culpability. Estrich recognizes that “[w]omen as well 
as men have been taught and come to believe that if a woman 
‘encourages’ a man, he is entitled to sexual satisfaction,” and 
“leading him on” in his perception often can be enough 
encouragement.41 This perceived sense of entitlement rings especially 
true when the defendant himself is physically attractive. For instance, 
jurors find it hard to believe that an attractive defendant would 
resort to rape.42 With this background on consent in the context of 
rape allegations, let us now consider consent in the context of 
intoxication. 
 
 39. Id. at 224. Pineau continues, “[U]nreasonable, that is, unless she were offered some 
pay-off for her stoic endurance, money perhaps, or tickets to the opera. The reason is that in 
sexual matters, agreement is closely connected to attraction.” Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 100 (1987). Estrich concludes: 
Conduct is labeled criminal “to announce to society that these actions are not to be 
done and to secure that fewer of them are done.” It is time—long past time—to 
announce to society our condemnation of simple rape, and to enforce that 
condemnation “to secure that fewer of them are done.” The message of the law to 
men, and to women, should be made clear. Simple rape is real rape. 
Id. at 104. Estrich continues:  
Or, as Ann Landers put it in 1985, “the woman who ‘repairs to some private place 
for a few drinks and a little shared affection’ has, by her acceptance of such a cozy 
invitation, given the man reason to believe she is a candidate for whatever he might 
have in mind.” From sociological surveys to prime-time television, one can find 
ample support in our society and culture for even the broadest notions of seduction 
enforced by the most traditional judges.  
Id. at 100 (citations omitted). 
 42.  FAIRSTEIN, supra note 30, at 135. Fairstein states that “colleagues and I have now 
heard hundreds of times—especially when middle-class, professional defendants stand up in the 
courtroom—the murmurs of prospective jurors or public onlookers saying, ‘I can’t believe it—
he doesn’t look like a rapist.’ or ‘He doesn’t look like he’d have to force someone to have sex 
with him.’” Id. 
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C. The Validity of “Intoxicated Consent” 
It is important to examine some interpretations of the validity of 
intoxicated consent, as well as some studies regarding perceptions of 
intoxication and how it affects consent. In his seminal work on the 
issue of consent, Alan Wertheimer identifies and evaluates five 
different claims about intoxicated consent.43 He begins with the 
“impermissibility claim,” which states that it is impermissible to 
engage in relations with someone who is intoxicated, regardless of 
whether the intoxication is self-induced. 44 Some state statutes have 
specifically defined rape to include situations where a person cannot 
resist due to intoxication.45 For instance, the California Penal Code 
provides that rape occurs when “the victim is prevented from 
resisting by an intoxicating, or anesthetic substance or any controlled 
substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably should have 
been known by the accused.”46 Thus, a man who knew or should 
have known that the woman was too intoxicated to resist will be 
culpable for committing rape, because it is impermissible to engage 
in sexual intercourse with a woman who is so intoxicated that she 
could not resist if she did not want to consummate the act of 
intercourse.  
In the majority of jurisdictions, however, a man bears 
responsibility for rape of an intoxicated person only when he 
administered the intoxicants to her, and not when she ingested them 
of her own accord.47 This means that  
 
 43. ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 232 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2003). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Ryan, supra note 1, at 414. In analyzing California’s rape by intoxication statute, 
Ryan explains that “the main issue is whether the victim had the capacity to exercise the 
reasonable judgment required to give legal consent. If ‘the level of intoxication of the resulting 
mental impairment was so great that the alleged victim can no longer exercise reasonable 
judgment,’ then the victim was prevented from resisting.” Id. at 415–16. Ryan recognizes only 
one third of the states provide protection to victims who voluntarily become intoxicated. Id. at 
414. 
 46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (Gould 2003). See also Karen M. Kramer, Rule by Myth: 
The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 115, 126–27 (1994) (“[T]he judge often instructs the jury to consider whether the 
intoxication prevented effectual resistance, thereby precluding consent. The law may also 
require less showing of resistance is typically necessary to prove nonconsent in cases where the 
victim was intoxicated.”). 
 47. Falk, supra note 2, at 173. The article explains:  
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a woman who was voluntarily intoxicated could not use this 
provision as the basis for a rape allegation. This is true even though 
the man knew or would be expected to know that she was 
incapacitated due to intoxication. From this perspective, the 
woman’s self-induced intoxication rescues the man accused of rape 
by intoxication because he cannot be prosecuted. Therefore, the 
woman assumes the risk of rape if she is voluntarily intoxicated.48  
Statutes of this kind provide one example of the extra responsibility 
placed on women for intoxicated sexual encounters as opposed to 
the decreased level of responsibility that is placed on men.  
The administration of intoxicant requirement present in most 
state statutes, in contrast to California’s statute which places greater 
responsibility on the male, imposes too great a burden on women 
 
47 of the 56 American jurisdictions reviewed here expressly include rape of 
intoxicated or drugged victims in their sexual offenses. Three jurisdictions, Georgia, 
Massachusetts and the military, rely on case law; six states protect mentally or 
physically incapacitated persons without mentioning drugs or other intoxicants. But 
two thirds of these jurisdictions require that the defendant administer the intoxicant for 
criminal liability before attaches. The remaining states focused instead on the 
inability of the victim to appraise the sexual nature of the conduct or to consent. 
The most common approach to defendant’s mens rea with respect to the 
incapacitated condition of the victim is to require knowledge the victim is 
incapacitated. About twenty percent of the jurisdictions emphasize the central 
question of consent and the connection between consent and victim incapacity in 
one form or another. 
Id. (emphasis added).  
 48. Ryan, supra note 1, at 415. Ryan explains the implication of the New Jersey statute: 
[W]hen the woman is voluntarily intoxicated, the man’s voluntary intoxication is not 
a factor at all because the woman’s intoxication rescues him from being prosecuted 
for rape. As a result, when the parties are mutually and voluntarily intoxicated, the 
woman assumes the risk of responsibility for rape; she is responsible for staying sober 
during sexual encounters. 
Id. at 420. Ryan concludes: 
Therefore, when the parties are voluntarily intoxicated, the law should be interested 
in evaluating both sides of the story to understand the context of the sexual 
encounter before deciding whether the man committed rape. It appears that the 
most significant factor in this determination is the level of the woman’s intoxication 
and whether or not her severe intoxication was apparent. If the woman displayed 
physical manifestations of her incapacity, then it seems reasonable to hold the man 
responsible, even if his own intoxication clouded his perception of the situation. 
However, if the intoxicated woman does not actually demonstrate her severe 
intoxication, then the man cannot be expected to evaluate the woman’s ability to 
provide legal consent. Under this latter scenario, it does not seem reasonable to hold 
the man responsible for rape, especially if the woman verbally consented to sexual 
intercourse. 
Id. at 429.  
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during intoxicated sexual encounters. Legislatures potentially could 
revise these statutes. Professor Falk proposes that for other 
jurisdictions such as New Jersey, “[t]he operative incapacity language 
of the intoxication provisions in sexual assault statutes should focus 
directly on consent because, after all, sexual offenses protect citizens 
from unwanted, nonconsensual sexual activity.”49 She also suggests 
that jurisdictions should prohibit activity with persons so intoxicated 
they are incapable of giving informed consent, as California has 
done.50 According to Falk, jurisdictions could easily accomplish this 
reform if legislatures would “simply omit the administration 
language common” to many of these provisions.51 Then, when a 
woman buys her own drinks, and the male had nothing to do with 
her intoxication, the incapacitation provision still would provide 
some recourse for any resulting non-consensual intercourse.  
Wertheimer’s second claim is that even if an intoxicated person 
consents to sexual intercourse, the consent is invalid because 
intoxication undermines the capacity for valid consent, which he calls 
the “intoxication claim.”52 Thus, a man is culpable for committing 
 
 49. Falk, supra note 2, at 199. Falk recognizes that California and some other states 
have incorporated a consent standard, stating that:  
As the statutes excerpted above indicate, a number of jurisdictions have already 
crafted their provisions to emphasize consent. Some of these provisions require that 
consent be reasoned, informed, knowing or legal. Others stress the importance of 
various cognitive or volitional abilities in the context of assessing consent. 
California’s definition emphasizes two important considerations in arriving at a 
notion of informed or knowing consent. First, to make a reasoned choice to 
participate in the proposed activity, the person must have sufficient information 
(knowledge) about the proposed activity, including the type of sexual contact 
involved, the identity of her sexual partner, and, perhaps even, information about 
the HIV-status of her partner. Second, that choice must be the product of her free 
will and not the result of various forms of coercion; California’s statute captures this 
notion in the use of voluntariness. Minnesota’s tripartite formulation—withhold 
consent, withdraw it, or communicate nonconsent—is helpful because it emphasizes 
that consent is a continuing activity not a one-time event. 
Id. at 199–200.  
 50. Id. at 201. 
 51. Id. 
 52. WERTHEIMER, supra note 43, at 232. The author makes an important distinction 
between the kinds of substances that may have a positive bearing on one’s decision to engage 
in these types of relations by explaining the difference between “substance-affected” consent 
and “intoxicated consent.” Id. at 235. Intoxicated consent is a subset of substance-affected 
consent. The distinction is that a woman giving intoxicated consent has distorted judgment 
whereas a woman that has substance-affected consent that is not from intoxication does not 
have distorted judgment. See id. at 236. Substance-affected consent occurs whenever some sort 
of substance has any sort of impact. See id. A common example could be that a person has a 
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non-consensual intercourse even if the woman consents, if 
intoxication invalidates her consent. The California statute also 
illustrates this intoxication claim because, according to Ryan, it 
provides that “the man assumes the risk of committing rape when 
the parties are mutually and voluntarily intoxicated and they engage 
in sexual intercourse. In other words the man is responsible for 
ensuring that the woman stays sober, or at least does not become 
heavily intoxicated, during sexual encounters.”53 Thus, if the woman 
is heavily intoxicated, her consent will not count, and the man can be 
culpable for rape.  
As applied, however, the California statute does not place a 
substantial portion of the risk with the man simply because the 
standard for evaluating whether a man knew or should have known is 
a very high one.  
As one California prosecutor explained from her experience 
prosecuting rape by intoxication cases, the intoxicated victim must 
be so ‘out of it’ that she does not understand what she is doing or 
what is going on around her. It is not a situation where the victim 
just ‘had too much to drink.’54  
When intoxication is not severe enough as to result in 
unconsciousness, or “being totally out of it,” the rape by 
intoxication statute is not available, and thus a prosecutor must 
either prove the force or threat of force and resistance requirements 
to find that a crime was committed. Thus, the greater burden is 
placed on the man only where the woman is that “out of it,” 
resulting in a fairer allocation of blame by holding the man, who was 
less intoxicated (as he would have to be in order to consummate the 
act), more responsible. Moreover, if a woman is truly “out of it,” 
 
headache and ingests Advil, which then makes the headache feel better so that she is later 
willing to consent to sexual activity. The medicine has not had an impact on the sexual 
behavior, yet it makes a person comfortable enough to engage in the activity. On the other 
hand, drugs with aphrodisiac properties would not only affect consent, but they also can 
constitute intoxicated consent. The author explains, “[W]e may prefer to understand 
intoxicated consent as referring to cases in which B’s ingestion of a substance increases the 
probability that she will token consent or will token consent for reasons that do not reflect her 
stable preferences or, perhaps, her higher-order preferences about her stable preferences.” Id.  
 53. Ryan, supra note 1, at 416. 
 54. Id. at 415–16. She states that while “[t]he statute does not require that a victim 
become so intoxicated that she is physically unable to speak or display a lack of actual  
consent. . . . mere intoxication ‘to some degree,’ or intoxication that ‘reduced the [woman’s] 
sexual inhibitions’ is not sufficient.” Id. at 416.  
GOODMAN.PP3 2/13/2009 5:56 PM 
57] Protecting the Party Girl 
 73 
then she might not even know what is happening and thus may 
never pursue criminal charges. 
Wertheimer’s third and fourth conceptions of consent are closely 
related and build on each other. The third conception is entitled the 
“responsibility claim” and stands for the proposition that if the 
intoxication is voluntary or self-induced, then the individual is 
responsible for his or her own intoxicated behavior.55 While the 
fourth conception arises from the third and is entitled the 
“responsibility entails validity claim,”56 which states that if the 
intoxicated individual is responsible for his or her own behavior, “it 
follows that intoxicated consent must be treated as valid.”57 In 
evaluating Wertheimer’s fourth claim, Kelman explains that 
Wertheimer’s view as “if members of the group (while sober) would 
typically prefer their consent to be valid (while drunk), it should be 
valid.”58 Wertheimer expects that sober people would prefer that 
their consent to receive a tattoo while intoxicated be invalid, while 
most sober women would prefer their consent to sex while 
intoxicated be valid.59 The difference is that the result of a tattoo is 
pain and permanent disfiguring of the body, whereas the result of 
intoxicated sexual intercourse is, in Wertheimer’s view, a relatively 
pleasurable experience without any long term physical consequence. 
 
 55. Wertheimer, supra note 43, at 232. Wertheimer also explains what he calls the 
“flow-through” view, which holds a person responsible for decisions they make post-
intoxication if that person was able to control her behavior pre-intoxication. Id. at 240. Under 
the flow-through view, we hold her responsible post-intoxication (“time-2”) for different 
decisions if she had the opportunity pre-intoxication (“time-1”) to guide her post-intoxication 
decisions because responsibility “flows through” to the different time periods. See id. at 241. 
The flow-through view recognizes that:  
we can justifiably ascribe responsibility to an agent for voluntary intoxicated 
behavior if she had the requisite volitional and epistemological capacities at the 
appropriate prior time. On the flow-through view, moral responsibility does not 
chronologically track the agent’s psychological capacities. If an agent has a fair 
opportunity at Time-1 to control or guide her behavior at Time-2, then our moral 
response to her use of those opportunities at Time-1 flows through to her behavior 
at Time-2, even if she is unable to guide or control her behavior at Time-2. 
Id. at 240–41.  
 56. Id. at 232. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Mark Kelman, Thinking About Sexual Consent, 58 STAN. L. REV. 935, 953 (2005) 
(reviewing ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS (2003)). 
 59. Id. 
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Kelman uses a hypothetical case to explain the problem in 
Wertheimer’s rationale,60 stating that  
Wertheimer believes that the fact that women would seem to go to 
parties with frat boys knowing that they risk tokening a drunken 
consent means that women prefer a world in which their drunken 
consent will count, but that assumption seems plainly wrong. We 
really do not observe the women’s behavior in a world in which 
they could go to the parties anyway without having their consent 
immunize the men from legal (or quasi-legal disciplinary) liability 
or moral opprobrium. The behavior could merely tell us that 
women value going to parties more than they devalue the expected 
losses from the sex. They could be better off still if they could 
decouple sexual risk from a social life.”61  
Thus, the “responsibility entails validity” claim does not hold up to 
closer scrutiny as a rationale for validating intoxicated consent when 
the other options are foreclosed.  
Although Wertheimer justifies the responsibility claim by citing 
the scenario of how voluntary intoxication is not an excuse for 
criminal liability, voluntary intoxication does in fact operate to 
reduce perceptions of responsibility for offenders in some cases.62 For 
instance, some studies have shown that juries find men less 
responsible for the rape of an intoxicated woman than of a sober 
woman, and men who are intoxicated receive less blame for rape and 
other violent criminal acts than men who are sober,63 which is 
counter to the responsibility claim for crimes generally. The next 
section of the Article (Part III) discusses the differential effects of 
 
 60. Kelman begins with an assumption that women’s preferences would be (in this 
ranking order): first, drinking at frat parties but not having sex even if intoxicated consent is 
given; second, drinking at frat parties and having sex if consent is given; and third, not 
attending frat parties, or not drinking at them, or not having sex. Id. at 969. If the women’s 
highest order preference is number one and the lowest order preference is number three, but 
because their highest preference is not an option actually available to them in the real world of 
fraternity parties, their apparent selection of option two cannot be interpreted as a preference 
for option two over option one. Id. 
 61. Id. at 970. 
 62. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 43, at 239. Wertheimer explains, “[o]n one view, we 
refuse to recognize voluntary intoxication as an excuse for wrongdoing because intoxication 
never (or rarely) defeats the agent’s ‘ability to reason about his obligations and to act in 
accordance with those obligations.’ Call this the reasoning view.” Id. 
 63. See Georgina S. Hammock & Deborah R. Richardson, Blaming Drunk Victims: Is It 
Just World or Sex Role Violation?, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1574 (1993). This brief 
article summarizes the results of research performed in the 1980s. 
GOODMAN.PP3 2/13/2009 5:56 PM 
57] Protecting the Party Girl 
 75 
alcohol on men and women, as well as the difference in the standard 
applied to men and women when judging their levels of 
responsibility for crimes (both as victims and perpetrators).  
Wertheimer’s fifth claim is the “consistency claim,” which states 
that in fact “if people should be held responsible for wrongful acts 
committed while intoxicated, then we must also treat [the purported 
intoxicated victim’s] consent as valid.”64 The consistency claim, 
however, does not provide a coherent argument for validating 
intoxicated consent because this argument is circular. If it were true 
that men are held less responsible for rape when the victim is 
intoxicated, then Wertheimer’s consistency claim would require that 
women bear less responsibility for their consent given while 
intoxicated. If intoxicated women are deemed to bear less 
responsibility in that circumstance, then intoxicated consent would 
not be valid under those circumstances, and a rape may have 
occurred. If female intoxicated consent is invalidated at the same rate 
that male intoxication diminishes male responsibility, then an 
increased number of instances of sexual intercourse will be classified 
as rape. If so, then more men would be responsible for their 
intoxicated conduct. Based on the limited empirical studies in this 
area, the consistency claim appears to then paradoxically require the 
consent of intoxicated females to be deemed valid. Therefore, the 
consistency claim would be impossible to fully implement because 
each time one side’s responsibility was adjusted to conform to the 
other’s, that fact of adjustment would lead to another imbalance, 
which would then require another adjustment. 
Each of these claims has flaws, and Wertheimer concludes that a 
“substantive morality argument informed by empirical 
investigation,” rather than logic, should determine whether 
intoxicated consent should be valid.65 That empirical investigation 
will require an analysis of the effects of alcohol on perception, 
understanding, and behavior. The next section provides that analysis.  
 
 64. WERTHEIMER, supra note 43, at 233. Wertheimer begins from the premise that 
some unambiguous token of consent has been given, whether it is verbal or behavioral, and 
thus does not address unconscious or semi-conscious consent or situations where non-consent 
is explicitly displayed. Id. 
 65.  Id.  
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III. THE INFLUENCES OF INTOXICATION 
Unlike the blanket assumptions that Wertheimer gives of not 
allowing intoxication to nullify consent, alcohol consumption should 
be considered in determining consent because of its effects on both 
the perpetrator and the victim. “Alcohol and drugs distort reality, 
cloud judgment, and slow reactions, causing men and women to 
expose themselves to dangers or disregard social constraints that 
might otherwise influence them.”66 In addition, people have 
individual expectations about the impact of alcohol on sexual 
relations, “which include the beliefs that alcohol increases sexual 
arousal, loosens women’s sexual inhibitions, and increases men’s 
feelings of power and dominance.”67 Studies have confirmed the 
manifestation of such expectations by demonstrating that men as 
well as women can become more aggressive after consuming 
alcohol.68  
Like the all-too-common excuse “she asked for it,” women who 
are intoxicated are deemed to have been even more responsible in 
having brought the situation upon themselves “because their 
drunkenness constitutes a violation of appropriate behavior for their 
gender.”69 Jurors and judges succumb to this “blame the victim” 
mentality as well.70 Some of the reluctance of judges and juries to 
 
 66. Ryan, supra note 1, at 412 (quoting ROBIN WARSHAW & MARY P. KOSS, THE MS. 
REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING, AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 11 
(Harper & Row 1988). 
 67. Karen M. Kramer, Rule by Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-
Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 115, 120 (1994). 
 68. Ryan, supra note 1, at 412. Ryan’s article further explains, “Many people experience 
an increase in aggressive behavior due to the consumption of alcohol.” Id. 
 69. Hammock & Richardson, supra note 63, at 1575. Hammock and Richardson 
explain that, in general, female intoxication is viewed more negatively than male intoxication; 
ingestion of alcohol by a female leads to a label of deviance. One reason for this negative view 
comes from traditional female gender role expectations. For the most part, these expectations 
center on home and family; drunkenness within these contexts is viewed quite harshly. Indeed, 
Hammock and Richardson found that the character of the victim was rated more negatively 
when she was intoxicated. Thus, intoxicated females are viewed negatively and might be 
attributed more blame for their victimization because their drunkenness constitutes a violation 
of appropriate behavior for their gender. Id. (citations omitted). The authors’ explanation of 
female intoxication gives the reasons for the observer to feel less sympathetic towards this 
female victim and may indicate that she behaved in an inappropriate way, such that in a just 
world certain harms might justifiably befall her. Id. 
 70. Alison West explains,  
There is also a reluctance on the part of judges and juries to convict if there is any 
indication of ‘victim misconduct.’ Examples of misconduct include drinking and 
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convict may be because of equivocal feelings demonstrated by the 
alleged rape victim, particularly when the perpetrator and the victim 
were previously acquainted.71 In the specific context of sex crimes, 
this conclusion applies as well, that “[i]ntoxication excuses men, but 
intoxicated women are perceived as bearing greater responsibility for 
being raped.”72 In analyzing social myths on juries and some other 
 
how the victim dressed. The trier of fact evaluates the credibility, trustworthiness 
and overall believability of the victim. Weighing the witness’ credibility is standard in 
all trials, however, in a rape case, the trier of fact often sets out with an eye towards 
disbelieving the victim’s story, particularly when the victim knew her rapist. Indeed, 
even if no misconduct is found, juries are loath to point an accusatory finger at 
someone whose only crime may have been misunderstanding the word ‘no.’ When 
the parties know each other, the reluctance to convict escalates. 
Alison West, Tougher Prosecution When the Rapist Is Not a Stranger: Suggested Reform to the 
California Penal Code, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 169, 187 (1994).  
 71.  Id. West recognizes:  
[M]any nonstranger rape victims are reluctant to use the word ‘rape’ when 
describing their assault. This is true even though all the factors that comprise the 
crime of rape are present. These victims do not perceive themselves as rape victims 
because they know their rapists and were not physically harmed. A [news] magazine 
study identified three common traits in nonstranger rape victims that prevented 
them from perceiving what happened to them as rape: (1) when the rape took place 
between dating partners, 2) when prior consensual sexual intimacy occurred 
between the rapist and the victim, and 3) when minimal violence was involved. 
These three traits, coupled with the victim’s subsequent experience of shame, guilt 
and reluctance to seek help, often contribute to the under-reporting of nonstranger 
rape. 
Id. at 177–78. 
 72. Kramer, supra note 67, at 121. See also Deborah Richardson & Jennifer L. 
Campbell, Alcohol and Rape: The Effects of Alcohol on Contributions of Blame for Rape, 8 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 468, 468 (1982). This article also discusses the notion 
that  
perceivers exaggerate the responsibility of the victim in order to restore notions of a 
just world while other studies have demonstrated that derogation of the victim’s 
character may serve the same purpose. Intoxication on the part of the victim may 
serve as a cue that facilitates use of either strategy, thus resulting in perceivers 
attributing more responsibility and/or derogating the character of an intoxicated 
victim.  
Id. at 469 (citation omitted). They recognize that the “just world” consideration is not 
applicable to the offender because “alcohol consumption by an offender is considered an 
extenuating circumstance of nonculpability because it is assumed that alcohol interferes with 
the ability to distinguish right from wrong. Consideration of intoxication as an ‘extenuating 
circumstance and nonculpability’ may lead to a decrease in blame to a drunken offender.” Id. 
One of the studies upon which this article was based involved female and male undergraduates 
enrolled in psychology classes who were given different scenarios in which a male party guest 
offered to help clean up a woman’s apartment after the party, initiated sexual advances, struck 
her, and then raped her when she refused his advances. Id. at 46970. Later, the experimenters 
changed the language of the story to provide subtle clues as to the levels of intoxication of the 
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studies that were performed in the 1980s and 1990s, Kramer also 
explains that the intoxicated offender was considered less culpable 
than a sober offender, while the intoxicated woman was considered 
more blameworthy than a sober woman.73 
The Article now turns to a brief examination of studies on the 
effects of alcohol consumption on men and woman separately. The 
first sub-section will focus on the effects of alcohol on females, and 
then the next sub-section will analyze the impact of alcohol on 
males, as well as on males’ reactions to females who have ingested 
alcohol.  
A. When Alcohol Lowers the Female’s Understanding of the Situation 
and Her Ability to Resist, the Risk of the Act Occurring Without 
Consent Increases 
One interesting point about the effects of alcohol on women is 
that women hold different views on intoxication and sex than what 
society would generally attribute to them. The majority of women 
responding to questionnaires did not believe that drinking was a 
declaration of sexual availability or that it made them less choosy 
about their partners or more sexually aggressive.74 While they 
believed that it made them less inhibited about sexual relations, they 
also believed that it did not make them less inhibited in partner 
choice.75 Nevertheless, some of the studies found that “intoxicated 
women are perceived as bearing greater responsibility for being 
 
offender or the victim or both. Id. at 470. Next, these subjects were asked to determine the 
level of responsibility or relative blame of the victim, the perpetrator, and the situation. Id. In 
addition, they were asked to consider what the police should do and what the police would do 
if the assault were reported. Id. Based on their analysis, the authors concluded,  
[I]t appears that the effect of the offender’s intoxication was to place greater blame 
on the situational factor of alcohol and less on the offender himself. [The] [v]ictim’s 
intoxication had no effect on participants’ attributions of relative blame. As noted 
above, the victim received an extremely small proportion of the relative blame for 
the incident (12%). 
Id. at 471. In addition, “the victim was rated as less moral . . . and more aggressive . . . when 
she was drunk than when she was sober. Participants also reported liking her less . . . and 
perceived themselves to be less similar to her . . . when she was drunk than when she was 
sober.” Id. at 472. While many of the “participants thought the offender should be charged 
with rape” (approximately 84%), “only 16% thought he actually would be [charged with 
rape].” Id. 
 73. Kramer, supra note 67, at 131. 
 74. Id. at 121. 
 75. Id. 
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raped.”76 This disconnect between the women’s own perceptions of 
their conduct and the reaction of society is based on sometimes-
erroneous perceptions of how alcohol affects women. 
One effect of alcohol consumption is that “[i]ntoxication may 
blur a woman’s understanding of the situation . . . .”77 When a 
woman does not understand her situation—for instance, that her 
partner is trying to get her to perform sexual acts that she may not 
be comfortable with—she is less likely to expressly dissent to any 
“preliminary activities.”78 While some women engage in preliminary 
activities as a precursor to sex, others engage in preliminary activities 
as a substitute for sex. During preliminary activities that are a 
substitute for sex, a woman who does not understand that her 
partner considers the preliminary activity to be a precursor to sex, is 
less likely to manifest any express dissent to the activities, because she 
is doing exactly what she wants to do—that is, engage in intimate 
activities that do not culminate in sexual intercourse. If the woman 
understood that her partner expected those preliminary activities to 
culminate in intercourse, and she did not wish to engage in 
intercourse, she would be aware of her need to manifest dissent, or 
to stop the activities before they escalated too far. However, because 
alcohol affects the woman’s capacity for understanding her situation, 
she may not realize the need for express dissent when engaging in 
preliminary activities while intoxicated.  
This impact on understanding leads some women who have been 
drinking to get into situations that they would not voluntarily seek 
out when sober. The irony is that such women are judged by the 
standard of a sober woman, who would be in those situations only if 
she put herself there voluntarily. Judging the intoxicated woman by 
the standard of a sober woman is unfair, given how alcohol impairs 
her understanding of her situation. For instance, Malm recognizes 
that in the acquaintance rape context, “a sort of willingness seems to 
be presumed that if one did not wish to be with a particular man one 
could leave before the relations escalated,” and this presumption 
provides some justification for the requirement that the prosecution 
 
 76. Id.  
 77. Sara Gill, Dismantling Gender and Racial Stereotypes: Using Education to Prevent 
Date Rape, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 27, 67 (1996). 
 78. For purposes of this Article, a “preliminary activity” is one that involves some 
intimacy, such as touching, kissing, cuddling, or fondling.  
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prove a lack of consent.79 However, the converse is not necessarily 
justified, because the presumption “cannot be used to defend the 
requirement that a woman show clear signs of dissent in order to 
establish nonconsent.”80 Some would argue that a voluntarily 
intoxicated female who follows a man to his home or dorm room, 
has actively consented to be where she is because a sober woman 
would not do so unless she was interested. Nevertheless, many of the 
stories will tell not of the female who explicitly consents to joining 
him in his room, or on his bed, but rather of the female who merely 
acquiesces in the male’s inquiry as to whether she would like to “rest 
for a while,” or “come in and sit down so we can talk in private,”—
neither of which constitutes consent to sexual activity.81 The lack of 
active dissent should not be able to constitute its opposite—
consent82—particularly when the woman’s ingestion of alcohol can 
have an impact on her understanding of the need to show dissent.  
An additional impact alcohol consumption has on women is that 
when their risk aversion mechanism is partially or wholly disabled as 
a result of that consumption, the mens’ potential interpretation that 
the activity was a precursor that suggests consent to intercourse may 
lead the women to go farther down the path before recognizing the 
increasing risk of unwanted sexual intercourse that flows from her 
consent to preliminary activities that she intended to be a substitute 
for intercourse. This decrease in risk aversion results in more risky 
behavior, such as going to the apartment of a new acquaintance or to 
 
 79. Malm explains that this presumption of willingness,  
[G]rounds a presumption of active consent. But to defeat such a presumption, one 
need not show (or learn) that the person actively dissented—the presumption is 
defeated if we show (or learn) that the particular person did not take active steps to 
get there—i.e., that she did not actively consent. Thus, with respect to the law on 
rape, the presumption in question could be used to explain why the state should 
carry the burden of proving that the woman did not actively consent to sexual 
intercourse. 
Malm, supra note 9, at 157. 
 80. Id.  
 81. This again raises the point of willingness to go along, made in McGregor’s article 
about having specific knowledge that one is consenting to the particular activity. See supra note 
6 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Malm, supra note 9, at 157. Malm concludes that “if consent is the signification 
of a particular mental state through the performance of an act, then, prima facie, it makes no 
sense to define consent in the negative—as the failure to perform another sort of act (active 
dissent).” Id. at 159. 
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the bedroom of an old acquaintance.83 Accompanying a man to his 
room or to a private place away from the rest of the party should not 
be considered an expression of consent to sexual relations. It may be 
consent to preliminary activities, but those can be either a precursor 
or a substitute for sexual relations. Kramer explains that “when a 
woman is visibly intoxicated, a man may interpret friendly or 
flirtatious behavior as an invitation to sex. Believing that alcohol 
reduces women’s inhibitions, the man may read her behavior as a 
demonstration of her true but disguised desire for sexual activity.”84  
The effects of alcohol consumption not only may hinder a 
woman’s ability to perceive risk but also may “hinder her ability to 
resist,” even if the woman does realize that the man is interpreting 
her behavior as a precursor, when she intends it to be a substitute.85 
Existing rape jurisprudence already implements a sliding scale of 
sorts for force when resistance is at issue. Historically, resistance was 
the main way to prove force. However, as the laws and their 
interpretations have evolved, courts have recognized that the 
resistance requirement was a bit arcane, and many states have 
dropped any explicit reference to resistance in the elements of the 
statute.86 Still, some states maintain that reference to resistance in 
 
 83. Ryan notes that “[a]nother study discovered that, as a contributing factor to this 
danger, intoxicated women who were raped ‘reported that their intoxication made them take 
risks that they normally would avoid.’” Ryan, supra note 1, at 412. See contra, William H. 
George & Jeanette Norris, Alcohol, Disinhibition, Sexual Arousal, and Deviant Sexual 
Behavior, 15 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD 131 (1991). When there is an expectation of 
consuming alcohol or alcohol is consumed in a small amount, women tend to be put more on 
guard, at least when alcohol is consumed in small quantities; in this scenario the authors found 
women to be “more anxious and less self-disclosing.” Id. at 134. George and Norris explain 
how social barriers are lessened regarding avoiding conflict, which results in intoxicated men 
taking greater risks as their conflict avoidance mechanisms becoming disinhibited. Id. at 137. 
See also Claude A. Steele & Robert A. Josephs, Alcohol Myopia: Its Prized and Dangerous 
Effects, 45 AM. PSYCHOL. 921, 924 (1990). Steele and Josephs explain that the “primary 
determinants of social behavior during intoxication, as during sobriety, are the internal and 
external cues that become salient to the actor,” and those cues can inhibit responses. Id. When 
alcohol impacts the processing or recognition of those cues, the responses may not be inhibited 
and risky behavior can result.  
 84. Kramer, supra note 67, at 120–21. 
 85. See discussion supra notes 9, 78 and accompanying text. 
 86. In describing the evolution of the consent and resistance requirement, one author 
notes, “where there was fear of deadly violence, the standard was slightly relaxed. In cases in 
which guns or knives were brandished by attackers, the utmost resistance standard was not 
required.” Mustafa T. Kasubhai, Destabilizing Power in Rape: Why Consent Theory and Rape 
Law Is Turned on Its Head, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 54 (1996). 
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defining the threat of force as one that is sufficient to overcome a 
reasonable person’s ability to resist.87  
The resistance requirement, while not explicit in more modern 
rape statutes, except to demonstrate the severity of a threat, remains 
a part of the courts’ and juries’ analysis in determining whether the 
force element was met, with the rationale being that: (1) the greater 
resistance, the greater force must have been used to overcome the 
will; (2) the less resistance, the less force; and (3) in the absence of 
resistance, either there is no force, or the force is so severe that 
resistance would be futile.88 Thus, a woman who is raped at gunpoint 
is not expected to provide any substantial physical resistance, based 
on the recognition that resistance in the face of a deadly weapon 
likely would be futile, if not also fatal.89 On the other hand, when the 
force is less, such as pushing the woman onto the bed and sitting on 
her, the failure to provide some physical resistance is usually fatal to 
any rape allegation.90 Even in situations that do not involve an 
intoxicated female, many courts find that a female who does not 
physically resist was not forced.91 This result is disappointing given 
greater resistance may lead to a possibility of even greater harm to 
the victim.92  
 
 87. See supra notes 5, 77 and accompanying text. 
 88. See generally McQueen v. State, 423 So. 2d 800, 806–07 (Miss. 1982) (Broom, J., 
dissenting). 
 89. See State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 72628 (Md. 1981). 
 90.  Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1346–48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) 
(arguing that there was insufficient force given that the victim did not fight harder when there 
was little danger of more serious physical injury). 
 91. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 33, at 277–79. Edwards provides an illustration of this 
concept in her discussion of Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), in 
which an 18-year-old victim went to defendant’s studio because he was going to help her be a 
model. He pushed her on the bed and removed her clothes and as he raped her she was crying. 
Explaining this case, Edwards states that “the Goldberg court held that the ‘force’ element had 
not been satisfied because there was no evidence that the defendant was going to physically 
harm her. The victim’s pleas to be left alone, and the defendant’s physical actions overriding 
those cries, were insufficient to establish ‘forceful’ behavior.” Id. at 279. 
 92. Edwards then describes McQueen, 423 So. 2d 800 (Miss. 1982), where the 
defendant raped his 14-year-old sister-in-law at a secluded spot. The author explains that:  
[B]ecause the defendant did not physically force the victim to comply and the victim 
failed to physically resist, the ‘force’ element was not satisfied. In sharp contrast, the 
dissent argued that the physical resistance should not be required. In addition, the 
dissent explains that it ‘is lamentable but true that too many times cases come before 
this Court showing the poor rape victim kicked, screamed, and physically fought to 
the bitter end—she became victim of a homicide following a rape.’  
Id. at 285 (citing McQueen, 423 So.2d at 806–07 (Broom, J., dissenting)). 
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The problems with resistance for sober victims suggest the 
additional difficulties resistance requirements pose for intoxicated 
victims. The diminished ability of an intoxicated victim to resist is 
caused by several factors. First, as mentioned earlier, some studies 
have shown that alcohol consumption leads some women to take 
greater risks than they would when sober.93 Consequently, when a 
woman takes greater risks, she may feel more invincible and less 
vulnerable to harm. However, when she does suffer harm because of 
those greater risks, she may also feel more at fault for her own lack of 
caution contributing to that resulting harm. Thus, when a woman 
takes the risk to go home to the apartment of a male after both have 
been drinking, she may feel like “nothing bad is going to happen.” 
Then when he starts to engage her in unwanted sexual activities, she 
is not able to resist as well as she would have been able to do when 
sober. Secondly, her verbal resistance (simply saying no, or repeating 
it) may be shut down or hampered by the depressive effect of the 
alcohol consumption. This may be especially true for those women 
who try to avoid confrontation. Thus, when a man provokes a verbal 
confrontation over issues such as “leading him on” or being “a 
tease,” the woman may simply succumb, rather than engage in the 
tiring but important conversation about consent. 
When the victim is intoxicated, less force is needed to get her to 
succumb and less resistance is possible given the effects of alcohol. 
Kramer explains that even when a woman “fails to become physically 
affectionate, since alcohol is a depressant, the woman may be less 
able to resist unwanted sexual advances. Her lack of resistance may 
sound like a resounding ‘yes’ to a man who subscribes to the 
traditional model of male aggression and female submission.”94 This 
lack of resistance ends up being used as evidence of affirmative 
consent, as discussed above.95  
In sum, women who consume alcohol may task greater risks and 
may have less understanding of circumstances and situations, which 
makes them less likely to appreciate the need for resistance or 
dissent. Nevertheless, because of the unique impact that alcohol has 
on decision-making skills, the fact that the woman voluntarily 
consumed alcohol should not be the deciding factor as to whether 
 
 93. Ryan, supra note 1, at 412. 
 94. Kramer, supra note 67, at 121. 
 95. See supra notes 4, 85–92 and accompanying text. 
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sexual intercourse was voluntary. The degrees of appreciation and 
understanding will vary with the level of alcohol consumption and 
individual tolerance. When engaging in preliminary activities, these 
effects can have a substantial impact on misperceptions about the 
existence and scope of consent, particularly for women who engage 
in these preliminary activities as substitutes rather than as precursors 
to intercourse. These combined effects of alcohol consumption put 
some women at greater risk for unwanted sexual intercourse.  
B. The Risk of the Male Misperceiving “Consent” Is Greater When He 
Has Consumed Alcohol 
What do we do about the intoxicated male? From a physiological 
perspective, medical researchers have formulated a theory about 
“alcohol myopia,” which is based on the idea that alcohol disinhibits 
the mechanism that regulates conduct as to socially accepted 
behaviors. Alcohol myopia also involves eliminating conflict with a 
perception of permission, and missing cues about unwillingness.96 In 
short, based on this theory, males who have more to drink are less 
likely to feel conflict about engaging in socially unacceptable 
behaviors, and therefore are more likely to engage in such conduct.  
Alcohol myopia causes “intoxicated males [to] . . . be less aware 
of whether the female consents and [they] may become more 
sexually aggressive than when sober.”97 A more aggressive male may 
make repeated and more intense requests for sex than a sober male, 
and unfortunately, the defendant’s pressure or repeated requests is 
not really considered in the issue of determining whether the consent 
was voluntary under rape law. Drawing the analogy to consent in the 
Fourth Amendment, stop and search context, one author notes that 
“repetitive requests are considered part of a courting game; the law 
 
 96. Alcohol myopia is a theory based on evidence that:  
[A]lcohol impairs attention, cognition, and information processing. It proposes that 
a person is more likely to exhibit a socially “excessive” behavior when intoxicated, if 
that behavior ordinarily is one that presents a conflict. By decreasing the person’s 
ability to process information, alcohol eliminates the conflict the personal would 
experience related to the behavior. This is referred to as alcohol myopia, and, 
supposedly, greater intoxication leads to greater myopia which leads to greater 
disinhibition.  
George & Norris, supra note 83, at 137. 
 97. Gill, supra note 77, at 67. 
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considers it to be seduction not rape.”98 But when repeatedly 
harassed by an intoxicated and aggressive male, who ignores a 
woman’s pleas to “calm down,” or “take a cold shower,” the woman 
may feel forced to engage in sex without consenting to do so. Men 
who become more forceful or violent may be more likely to 
disregard their partner’s feelings, thus the effects of alcohol myopia 
may lead to more non-consensual intercourse.99  
Alcohol myopia also applies to lower levels of consumption 
because a man may be willing to rationalize his sexual behavior after 
drinking. Researchers note that “[i]t is conceivable that when 
alcohol is consumed in low dosages, a person exploits the alcohol 
excuse to lead to sexual disinhibition. When alcohol is consumed in 
higher dosages (although not so high as to suppress sexual arousal 
completely), alcohol myopia becomes alcohol’s main contribution to 
sexual disinhibition.”100 Thus, a male may over-rely on the “alcohol 
excuse” to rationalize behavior that is more sexually aggressive than 
he would normally feel is appropriate, because he expects his 
behavior to be effective. This expectation may cause him to actually 
change his behavior simply because his inhibitions about sexual 
aggression have been reduced—even when he did not consume 
enough alcohol for the alcohol itself to change his behavior.101  
 
 98. Kasubhai, supra note 86, at 72. In describing the differences between manifestations 
of consent in the rape context and the Fourth Amendment search context, Kasubhai writes 
that the U.S. Supreme Court “determined that the duration of consent may be restricted by an 
explicit withdrawal of consent, or by actions of the accused which implicitly withdraw such 
consent.” Id. at 71. Kasubhai also acknowledges that while “consent to Fourth Amendment 
searches cannot be imputed from one instance to another,” in a rape case retracting consent 
does not work unless there is a finding of force because there is no prohibition against 
imputing consent in one instance to another instance where the parties are in a relationship.” 
Id. at 71–72. Another difference she explains is as follows: “the perpetrator is not obligated to 
obtain express consent before his intrusive violation and subordination of a woman,” and yet 
explicit consent is not required in rape law. Id. at 72. 
 99. Ryan, supra note 1, at 412 (“An intoxicated man may become less attuned to the 
woman’s desires while becoming more forceful and violent than he would generally act if 
sober. Some studies demonstrate that a man’s consumption of alcohol significantly increases 
the probability that he will attempt to rape his companion.”). 
 100. George & Norris, supra note 83, at 137 (“Alcohol can influence the expression of 
deviant and non-deviant sexual behavior; however, this influence is shaped by numerous 
qualifying conditions, such as dosage, gender, and expectancy.”). 
 101. Some feel that men assume the risk of non-consensual sex when they drink too 
much alcohol. For instance, Wertheimer contrasts the intoxication of the male in the situation 
stating, “We can say that A puts himself at risk for liability for behavior that he would have 
avoided if sober,” though he recognizes that this is merely the beginning of the discussion. 
Wertheimer, supra note 16, at 583. Others believe that alcohol use excuses socially excessive 
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This brief analysis of the effects of alcohol on males and females 
provides the additional background necessary to formulate a new 
standard for evaluating intoxicated consent. The next section sets 
forth the proposed standard. 
IV. A PROPOSED STANDARD FOR EVALUATING CONSENT WHEN 
ONE OR BOTH PARTIES HAVE IMBIBED ALCOHOL 
This Article suggests that the most straightforward approach to 
solve the problems identified above would be a sliding scale where 
the level of explicitness for consent rises with the level of alcohol 
consumption. For instance, if a woman has had four or five alcoholic 
drinks in two hours, she would have to be more explicit in stating 
her agreement to engage in sexual relations than would a woman 
who has consumed one or two drinks in that same two-hour period. 
When people consume few drinks, their less-explicit expressions of 
consent can be adequate. Less-explicit expressions, such as words or 
deeds that indicate interest or attraction but that fall short of explicit 
agreement, may adequately protect the parties’ interest in engaging 
in voluntary sexual intercourse. This flexibility would satisfy the 
concern of some that requiring a verbal sexual contract of sorts 
detracts from the amorous experience and will hinder some women 
and men from being able to participate in consensual sexual 
experiences. 
A. At One End: Explicit Verbal Consent When Either Party Is 
Intoxicated? 
Based on the research above, this Article supports the 
proposition that “individual circumstances of a sexual encounter 
 
behaviors in men, including sexual behaviors, but at least one study demonstrates that society 
does not necessarily support the “excuse conferring property” of alcohol. See, e.g., George & 
Norris, supra note 83, at 136. The authors caution about some underlying assumptions with 
this theory, stating,  
it assumes men consider alcohol consumption to be a viable excuse for deviant 
sexual indulgence, and that once drinking commences this expectancy influences 
their behavior. While questionnaires have established that people generally believe 
alcohol enhances or disinhibits sexuality, studies have not yet established that people 
endorse alcohol’s excuse conferring properties. In addition there is only modest 
support for the idea that previously held expectancy about alcohol can affect 
behavior after drinking.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
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must be understood and evaluated before holding either the man or 
the woman responsible for a rape allegation when both parties were 
voluntarily intoxicated.”102 One way to make the evaluation of 
circumstances more straightforward would be to require explicit 
verbal consent when either of the parties is voluntarily intoxicated. 
Because “there is no bright line test for determining how much 
alcohol or drugs inhibits a person’s ability to consent, there must be 
a bottom line.”103 That bottom line, as suggested by Seidman and 
Vickers, is that “if alcohol is present, non-consent must be presumed 
unless a woman makes an explicit verbal statement she wishes to 
engage in sexual intimacy that includes penetration.”104 If explicit 
verbal consent were required, then there would be less ambiguity 
and less room for misinterpretations that may lead to allegations of 
rape when the parties are intoxicated.  
Some may say that this requirement of explicit consent and 
presumption of non-consent goes too far, and will prevent people 
from having consensual intercourse simply because so often alcohol 
is a part of sexual relations. However, this requirement is not that all 
parties remain sober; “[w]omen do not have to be cold sober to 
engage in consensual sexual intimacy, but they ought to be sober 
enough to say yes. If a woman is not sober enough to say yes, then 
no consent should be presumed.”105 This rule may seem difficult to 
implement during the course of such encounters as other authors 
have addressed, but only to the extent that we accept the notion that 
women may prefer not to say yes when they mean yes,106 or that 
 
 102. Ryan, supra note 1, at 429.  
 103. Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next 30 Years 
of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 486 (2005). 
 104. Id. at 486–87. 
 105. Id. at 487. 
 106. See infra Part IV.C. For instance, Wertheimer concludes that we should reject the 
impermissibility claim for the following reasons:  
Not to protect predatory males or to hold women accountable for their irresponsible 
behavior, but because it does a better job of balancing the positive and the negative 
autonomy of women than a more restrictive approach. First, the pleasures of alcohol 
and sex are so closely intertwined for some that to require contemporaneous sober 
consent would be unduly restrictive. Second, because the disinhibiting [sic] effects 
of alcohol are widely understood, a permissive approach does not reduce predatory 
behavior in which A takes advantage of B’s ignorance. Third, to insist on sober ex 
ante consent to subsequent intoxicated consent would preclude many women from 
doing precisely what they want to do, namely not to be required to consent before 
they become intoxicated.  
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women strongly prefer to indicate their consent in other ways. It 
seems overly patronizing to suggest that women cannot (or do not) 
give consent when they are sober, out of some sense of guilt, and 
therefore would be deprived of any sexual relations if they were 
required to fess up and make their consent known before the 
cocktails arrived.  
B. The Limits on Explicit but Inebriated Consent 
The next question is how to decide whether one is sober enough 
that a yes means a yes. When should a yes not mean yes? When is a 
woman too intoxicated to give effective consent? Just as consent to 
an auto purchase contract could be invalidated on the grounds of 
incapacity to consent based on intoxication, so too should 
intoxication invalidate even explicit consent if the woman was not 
capable of understanding her situation. In the easy cases of severely 
intoxicated women, some statutes provide protection when the man 
knew or should have known about her level of intoxication, but the 
majority of states provide this protection only when the accused 
administered the alcohol to the woman.107 If the level of intoxication 
is not enough to implicate the incapacitation ruling (or when the 
intoxicant was self-administered and therefore is not actionable 
under most state statutes), some protection is still needed for the 
woman who might say the word “yes” without meaning or 
understanding fully its implications for subsequent sexual 
intercourse.  
In analyzing the conflicting issues over whether intoxicated 
consent should be valid, Professor Kelman considers reactions of 
autonomy theorists as to 
how we should conceive of why women, when drunk, may 
sometimes token consent to sex to which they would not consent 
when sober. Broadly speaking, one could argue that intoxicants 
impact emotion, desire, and/or cognition. To the degree they 
merely impact emotion or desire, intoxicants simply pose problems 
of inconsistent wills.108  
 
WERTHEIMER, supra note 43, at 257. This last sentence is the most troubling because it 
suggests that there is no harm without considering all the potential instances under which 
there can be harm.  
 107. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 108. Kelman, supra note 58, at 977. 
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The implication is that intoxicated and sober women may, when 
balancing the same considerations, reach different results due to the 
intoxication. A rational approach would require that consent be valid 
when the woman’s cost-benefit analysis leads to the same decision 
about sexual relations, whether she was intoxicated or sober. The act 
is not “against her will,” given the decision that she has affirmatively 
made. In this way, we avoid requiring the male to be a “mind-
reader,” and validate intoxicated consent in some situations. 
Nevertheless, we still might hope that men will ask the follow up 
question (“Are you sure? You have been drinking and I don’t want 
you to regret this.”) before proceeding in the face of intoxicated, but 
explicit, consent.  
Another approach would be to say that an “intoxicated woman is 
simply incapable of totaling up costs and benefits as well as a sober 
woman.”109 Under this view, intoxicated consent should not be valid 
because the intoxication partially incapacitates the woman’s 
deliberative process such that she is not able to weigh and measure 
all of the costs and benefits before making her decision to consent. 
This conclusion is consistent with current law in some jurisdictions 
on the issue of incapacitation, but only when the incapacity is severe. 
The proposed sliding-scale approach suggests that the definition of 
incapacity be softened to include room for a partial incapacity that 
affects the deliberative process without wholly shutting that process 
down, as seems to be required under the current “she must be so out 
of it,” standard described above.110  
 
 109. Id. Kelman discredits another rationale explaining the following:  
The autonomy theorist would argue that the intoxicated woman is simply not 
competent to make such an important decision that is (adequately likely) to be 
wrong for her. I am dubious that anyone sincerely adopts this strategy. To do so 
would require ascertaining, for instance, whether the inebriated Ivy League college 
girl is still ‘smarter’ than most women—all permitted to legitimately grant sexual 
consent—are when sober. Alternatively, of course, competence is doing no work at 
all: the fact that the expected value of decision is negative is completely driving the 
decision that she could not be making her choice competently.  
Id. at 978. 
 110. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. Under California’s incapacity 
standard, the male must know or should have known about the level of incapacity of the 
female in order for the act to constitute the crime of rape, so we may need to keep that 
qualifying language here, such that the male is not charged with rape if he did not know, and 
should not have known about the female’s partial incapacity. If that is the case though, then 
we may swallow up any effectiveness of changing the standard to partial incapacitation because 
the risk stays with the female when she tokens consent when intoxicated, unless she is so “out 
of it” that the male should have known that she did not have the capacity to consent.  
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A softening of the standard also would help to lessen the effect of 
the double standard. When the man is so severely intoxicated that he 
is “out of it,” it is unlikely that he would be able to consummate the 
sexual act. Even if he tries to force himself on the woman, he likely 
will not be able to accomplish penetration. In contrast, the female 
can still be penetrated, even if she is completely “out of it,” as in 
nearly unconscious, or even not quite so out of it that she can still 
experience what is happening. She may not be “with it” enough to 
withdraw her consent or stop the rape from occurring, yet under 
current standards this partial incapacitation often fails to provide a 
firm factual basis for a subsequent rape prosecution. A sliding scale 
would provide room for the jury to evaluate how intoxication levels 
less than “completely out of it” can influence or obviate express 
consent. 
Another approach to consider is Wertheimer’s argument that 
intoxicated consent should be valid if women would prefer, when 
sober, that their later intoxicated consent be valid, which is based on 
his assumption that many women prefer to have sex when 
intoxicated, rather than when sober.111 This approach may provide 
more protection for intoxicated consent than would be ideal.  
Noting that not all women agree with Wertheimer’s position, 
Kelman suggests that a regime allowing women who desire to have 
valid, intoxicated consent engage in sexual relations will increase 
women’s well-being.112 Those women who would prefer that their 
 
 111. As noted above, Wertheimer states that women would prefer that their drunken 
consent be valid as consent, if you ask them when they are sober, because many women do not 
want to be responsible for their decisions to consent to intercourse, and the alcohol relieves 
them of that responsibility. If drunken consent were not acceptable, however, then men would 
be risking too much to have sex with drunken women, and the women would get less sex, and 
that would be a lower-level preference than that of having drunken consent be valid. See supra 
note 55 and accompanying text.  
 112. Kelman, supra note 58, at 969–70. In analyzing the question of whether intoxicated 
consent should be valid, Kelman provides a useful thought-experiment by reviewing the issue 
of intoxicated consent as one of power, rather than one of incapacitation. While “we may think 
it’s sensible to delegitimize (legally or morally) drunken consent,” Kelman recognizes that 
another option would be to force “women to exercise more self control in granting consent 
once drunk,” because he foresees a greater harm resulting from a regime that in effect required 
the fraternity boys to hold sex-free parties for drunken women. Id. at 970. Kelman explains 
that  
we may think the mechanism that focuses exclusively on the frat boys will harm B’s 
more than one that focuses on forcing the women to exercise more self-control in 
granting consent once drunk or one that facilitates their capacity to make the same 
choices when drunk as they would make in advance. 
GOODMAN.PP3 2/13/2009 5:56 PM 
57] Protecting the Party Girl 
 91 
intoxicated consent be invalid can exercise greater self control or 
have their friends help them to ensure that they do not give consent 
when intoxicated.113  
So which is the better approach: to create a standard that 
validates intoxicated consent in advance, such that certain actions or 
deeds constitute consent, or to have the jury decide post hoc whether 
the intoxicated consent should have been valid or invalid after 
analyzing the particular circumstances of the encounter? Based on 
what we know about alcohol decreasing both a woman’s ability to 
resist, as well as her ability to understand that resistance might be 
necessary, it is not likely that most women, when sober, would 
choose to have their failure to dissent substitute for actual consent 
when they are intoxicated. It seems that the better alternative would 
be to let the jury consider the circumstances and make a 
determination to validate or invalidate consent. The circumstances 
for jury consideration should include (1) the amount of alcohol 
consumption by each party, (2) the level of intoxication 
 
Id. He continues, “This may be a matter of telling Bs that they had better focus, even when 
drunk, because the men will not be deterred from following their expressed wishes; it may be a 
matter of finding a designated sober girlfriend to keep them from following frat boys to their 
rooms.” Id.  
 113. Id. at 970. 
Women-focused mechanisms may (depending on the empirics) seem superior if we 
believe that women do not have uniform tastes: a rule that focuses on changing A’s 
behavior will cause welfare losses for the subset of women who gain from having sex 
while drunk, while one that focuses on changing B’s behavior will permit those who 
gain utility (over the course of their lives) by having inebriated sex to do so. 
Id. Based on the power dynamic, Kelman is troubled by the inconsistency in Wertheimer’s 
rationale for the validity of intoxicated consent and the invalidity of coerced consent; however, 
a discussion of coercion is beyond the scope of this Article. The basic dichotomy is as follows: 
Wertheimer explains that intoxicated consent should be treated as valid if when they were 
sober they would prefer that to be the case, but he does not follow the same procedure when 
talking about coerced consent. Intoxication, in Wertheimer’s view, is an issue of competence, 
but Kelman finds a logical inconsistency in these two approaches, stating:  
If he is willing to admit the women’s intoxicated consent to sex should not count, at 
least so long as they would prefer to have the option that it does not count, even 
though they're not morally entitled to a world in which boys host sex free parties for 
them, it is unclear why he thinks that moral entitlement does any work in thinking 
about ‘coercion’ and power. 
Id. at 971. The implication of this statement seems to be that coerced consent should be valid 
if they would prefer to have the option of coerced consent being valid in advance because there 
is no moral entitlement to a coercion-free environment. We cannot expect sexual relations to 
be coercion-free, and some women would choose that their coerced consent be valid, such as 
when the coercive force involves harm to a loved one, or a benefit like admission to graduate 
school. 
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demonstrated by each party, (3) the level of explicitness of the 
consent, (4) any verbal or conduct evidence of non-consent or 
dissent such as resistance, ambivalence, or reluctant acquiescence, 
and (5) testimony about whether any preliminary activities were 
intended as precursors or substitutes for intercourse. An evaluation 
of all of these factors will help the jury to determine when and 
whether explicit but inebriated consent is adequate to constitute 
legal consent in each particular case.  
C. Resolving Ambiguity in the Vast Middle Ground 
In between the explicit yes or explicit no is the more interesting 
analysis of when equivocal actions or words should be adequate to 
constitute consent. The sliding scale also should apply to equivocal 
words and many actions, such that the greater the level of 
intoxication, the less likely that equivocal words or deeds can be 
considered sufficient to constitute proper consent. The more drinks 
one has consumed in the relevant time period, the more likely that 
only explicit consent will be valid.  
Some might say that it would not be reasonable to require men 
to make the determination of what level of explicitness is required 
for consent to be valid. This is particularly true where the woman 
does not demonstrate or manifest the severity of her level of 
intoxication, or when the man has no knowledge as to how many 
drinks the woman has consumed over the relevant time period.114 
When there is doubt, however, it would seem equally reasonable to 
err on the side of requiring explicit consent. A firm “yes, I do” will 
be substantial evidence to establish consent.115  
So what are the standards for determining whether words or 
deeds are sufficiently equivocal to require a more explicit statement 
to constitute adequate consent? First, an inquiry is needed into 
whether the victim intended such conduct to substitute for an 
assertion about consent (I do, or I will). If so, the second inquiry 
should be whether the consent was to “preliminary activities,” as 
 
 114. Ryan, supra note 1, at 429 (explaining why it is not reasonable to hold men 
responsible when a severely intoxicated woman does not demonstrate the severity of her 
intoxication). 
 115. Although there are situations in which even a “yes” by a severely intoxicated person 
should not be adequate for consent, and the section above discussed the point at which explicit 
consent would be invalid. See supra Part IV.B. 
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discussed above, or to consummating sexual intercourse. If that 
consent was to preliminary activities, then the next inquiry is whether 
those preliminary activities were interpreted by the victim as a 
precursor to intercourse, or as a substitute for intercourse. If she 
intended her consent to be to preliminary activities as a substitute for 
intercourse, and she consumed alcohol prior to or during the 
encounter, then only her explicit consent to intercourse should be 
acceptable to override the limited scope of her initial consent. If her 
consent was to the preliminary matters as a precursor to intercourse, 
then less explicit statements or conduct would be needed to confirm 
her consent to intercourse, even though she had consumed alcohol 
prior to or during the encounter.116  
Some may argue that this approach is overly complex, and too 
difficult for intoxicated individuals to understand. That would be 
true for those who have significant intoxication levels, and the judge 
or jury would have to make the determination as to whether that 
level was substantial enough to obviate consent. For those women 
who are less intoxicated, such that they can remember how they felt 
on the question of precursor and substitute activities, applying this 
approach would be relatively straightforward. 
Turning to the resistance and force issue, this Article 
recommends that the existing sliding scale for force used by courts in 
rape cases generally should be applied in intoxication cases. This 
sliding scale would require the prosecution to show less force to 
satisfy the force element the more alcohol the victim had consumed 
at the time. Similarly, less evidence of resistance should be necessary 
to show non-consent when the victim has consumed more alcohol. 
For instance, a sober woman may give a firm “no!” whereas that 
same woman, when intoxicated may say something like, “I’m not 
sure about that,” or, “I don’t think we should.” This milder form of 
verbal resistance may be all that the intoxicated woman feels is 
necessary (given the distortion of her perception and understanding 
of her situation), or it may be the only manifestation of dissent that 
she is capable of expressing (given how alcohol can lower the ability 
to resist). At higher levels of intoxication, these statements should 
constitute adequate resistance based on the sliding scale. Conversely, 
 
 116. This analysis is putting aside the situation where she becomes so intoxicated that 
only explicit consent will suffice, or so severely intoxicated that she is deemed incapable of 
giving effective consent to intercourse, which has been addressed above. See supra Part IV.B.  
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when the victim has had only a minimal amount of alcohol, these 
statements may not be enough to satisfy the resistance issue because 
they likely would not be enough under the current standards. This 
sliding-scale approach takes into account the specific effects of 
alcohol consumption on women that can prevent or dampen 
resistance and lead to non-consensual intercourse with a lower level 
of force.  
D. Silence Will No Longer Be Sufficient Evidence of Consent If Alcohol 
Was Consumed 
Another form of “equivocal conduct” to consider in evaluating 
consent in sexual encounters is the failure to speak, or the presence 
of silence. Silence is subject to interpretation and can mean assent or 
dissent, depending upon the circumstances. In important matters, 
however, silence is only deemed to be assent, or concurrence, in the 
case of adopted admissions. For instance, if a statement is made by 
another and a reasonable person would have responded to the 
statement if untrue, one’s failure to respond suggests a tacit 
admission that the statement was true.117 Even in that particular 
situation, an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances is 
warranted to ascertain whether the silence can and should be deemed 
to be assent. That inquiry includes ensuring that the person heard 
and understood the significance of the statement made.118  
At other times, silence occurs because there has been no inquiry 
by the other party; no statement or question requiring a verbal 
response. Some suggest that a rape charge should be available when 
the perpetrator was “consciously aware that his conduct may be 
wrongful,” or, “willfully blinded” by “male self-deception” and 
purposefully did not inquire about consent;119 such as when he meets 
 
 117. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1221 and committee notes (West 2007). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 381, 388 (2005) (“Although further research is needed, I will argue in 
the following Sections that male self-deception about whether a woman has consented to 
sexual intercourse is plausibly widespread and is morally worse than ordinary forms of criminal 
negligence.”). He explains the concept of self-deception and uses the example of a conscious 
commitment to helping the deserving poor while having anxiety about financial security and 
states that “our unconscious mind might routinely encourage awareness of instances in which 
the condition of the poor seems to be due to their own lack of initiative and ignore 
contradicting information. This information-gathering bias enables us to limit our charitable 
contributions.” Id. at 395. However, “[o]ur refusal to do so contains an element of intention 
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someone at a party, whose “inhibitions are lowered” by her alcohol 
consumption.120 As things escalate, “he finds himself not wanting to 
ask her if she is really sure that she wants to have sex. He is afraid 
that she might say no.”121 This failure to inquire can result in silence 
being the only evidence of consent or non-consent, and the crucial 
question to examine is why silence is defaulted to consent in 
acquaintance rape situations particularly. Given the effects of alcohol 
consumption described above, including its alteration of one’s 
capacity to understand the need for resistance, and its tendency to 
make males more aggressive and less sensitive to their partner’s needs 
and desires, a presumption that silence constitutes consent is 
especially dangerous when the alleged victim was intoxicated. 
Accordingly, it is this Article’s proposition that there is no principled 
reason why silence should be presumed to constitute consent, in the 
absence of conduct that suggests consent to preliminary activities as a 
precursor to, rather than a substitute for, intercourse.  
McGregor disagrees with the notion that silence should never 
constitute consent, and provides a five-part test for analyzing 
whether silence can constitute consent in a particular 
circumstance.122 For silence to constitute consent, McGregor 
proposes that the following conditions must be met: (1) awareness 
that one is giving consent, (2) knowledge that silence is an 
expression of consent and the substance of what that consent entails, 
(3) intention to consent by silence, (4) being “given a reasonable 
amount of time to respond,” and (5) “the means of dissent must be 
reasonably easy to perform.”123 In evaluating the reasonableness of 
expressions of dissent, she explains that “we need to know the 
baseline of the person to judge when a state of affairs is an evil or 
 
though that does not mean that we unconsciously ‘intend’ to lie to ourselves in the same sense 
that we use the word when referring to conscious thoughts.” Id. at 396.  
 120. See Meredith J. Duncan, Sex Crimes and Sexual Miscues: The Need for a Clearer Line 
Between Forcible Rape and Consensual Sex, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1120–21 (2007). 
 121. Id. at 1121. “He does not understand any of her body language as protests. They 
have sex. Unlike previous scenarios, this is a defendant who was aware of the risk that she did 
not consent. He was aware that she may not consent if asked, and he proceeded with the 
sexual contact anyway.” Id. Based on this scenario, Duncan concludes that “[t]his should 
constitute rape, particularly considering the perpetrator’s state of mind.” Id. She argues for 
recklessness to be the required mental state for a forcible rape conviction, and to have a 
separate offense for nonconsensual sex without force. Id. at 1124–25.  
 122. McGregor, supra note 6, at 175. 
 123. Id. at 194.  
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benefit for them” to help us decide whether silence should constitute 
consent.124 McGregor’s factors, however, would be difficult to 
establish in the specific context of intoxicated sexual encounters 
because apparent silent consent may be a misunderstanding by the 
woman of the actions performed by the man. For instance, it is less 
likely that one of the intoxicated parties will make a statement such 
as, “we’re going to have consensual sex now,” which would 
implicate the adopted admission rationale. More commonly, no 
statements are made, but actions are engaged in, and consent is 
imputed from specific acts such as returning a kiss, assisting with the 
removal of clothing, or using protection.125 Actions too are subject 
to interpretation, and some are more suggestive of consent than 
others, but many actions can be misinterpreted when the female feels 
or fears the presence of force and the male does not realize her fears.  
Depending upon the level of intoxication, a woman may not be 
aware that her silence will constitute consent, and she may not be 
aware that being silent means sexual intercourse will follow, nor may 
she intend that result. If the woman sees “preliminary activities” as a 
substitute rather than as a precursor to sexual intercourse, she may 
be even less aware that her silence indicates consent to not only 
preliminary activities, but also to intercourse. The reasonableness of 
the amount of time to respond should be extended substantially 
when dealing with intoxicated decision makers because the greater 
the level of intoxication, the more difficult it is to express dissent. 
Thus, even if McGregor’s test were adopted, it would not provide a 
satisfactory mechanism for evaluating whether silence by an 
intoxicated individual should constitute consent based on the 
depressive effects of alcohol and the increased risk taking associated 
with alcohol consumption. Words, rather than actions, would help to 
clarify ambiguities. If we do not go so far as to require explicit verbal 
consent, another important re-allocation of the risks would involve 
declassifying silence as a form of consent in sexual relations where 
 
 124. Id. at 197 (talking about the difference between deserved evil, i.e., a prison term for 
a crime one committed, and undeserved evil, such as consent to sexual relations in exchange 
for a passing grade).  
 125. See also Ian Ayres & Katherine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 599, 625–27 (2005) (describing a case where a grand jury refused to indict, and 
despite the secrecy of the proceedings, one grand juror explained that “some jurors believe that 
the woman’s act of self-protection [by requesting a condom] might have implied her consent,” 
and the subsequent public outcry and statutory revisions since then). 
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one or both parties have consumed alcohol, as has been suggested by 
other scholars as well.126 In short, silence never should constitute 
consent in intoxicated sexual encounters.  
V. CONCLUSION  
This Article has proposed a sliding scale for evaluating whether 
consent should be valid in acquaintance-rape situations when one or 
both parties have consumed alcohol prior to or during an intimate 
encounter. This sliding-scale approach suggests that the more 
alcohol that has been consumed, the more explicit manifestations of 
consent must be, although at some point, even explicit consent will 
not be adequate when the woman is intoxicated to the point of 
incapacity. In addition, this sliding scale would amend the 
application of many existing rape and sexual assault statutes in several 
ways. First, explicit consent is not required under most existing 
statutes but would be required in some circumstances under this 
approach. More equivocal words or conduct will be permissible 
evidence of consent at the lower levels of alcohol consumption. 
Second, this approach would reduce the level of intoxication 
necessary to trigger a relaxation of the force and resistance 
requirement and provide protection not only for the severely 
intoxicated, but also for those at lower levels of intoxication who are 
unable to effectively resist due to alcohol consumption. Existing 
statutes omit the force and resistance requirements when the 
intoxication is severe, or when the intoxicant was administered by 
the defendant, but this standard would provide protection even 
when the intoxicant was voluntarily ingested. Finally, this Article 
recommends that silence be inadequate to constitute consent when 
either party has consumed more than a de minimis amount of 
alcohol. Current standards use silence as evidence of consent in some 
cases. Incorporating this sliding-scale approach into jury instructions, 
as well as reported judicial decisions, would help to protect more 
women from the dangers of intoxication during intimate activities. 
  
 
 126. See, e.g., Seidman & Vickers, supra note 103, at 484–85 (“[I]t is crucial that silence 
be eliminated as an indicator of consent, and that consent be defined, as it is in other areas of 
the law in which consent is an element.”). 
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